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ABSTRACT. Increased devolution of forest ownership and management rights to local control has the
potential to promote both conservation and livelihood development in remote tropical regions. Such shifts
in property rights, however, can generate conflicts, particularly when combined with rapidly increasing
values of forest resources. We explored the phenomenon of Brazil nut (Bertholletia excelsa) theft in
communities in Western Amazonia. Through interviews with 189 Brazil nut collectors in 12 communities
in Bolivia and Brazil and participation in the 2006 and 2007 harvests, we quantified relative income derived
from Brazil nuts, reported nut thefts, and nut collection and management practices. We found a much
greater incidence of reported Brazil nut thefts in Pando, Bolivia than in the adjacent state of Acre, Brazil.
Our analyses suggest that three factors may have affected nut thefts in the forest: (1) contrasts in the timing
and process of formally recognizing property rights, (2) different historic settlement patterns, and (3)
varying degrees of economic dependence on Brazil nuts. Threat of theft influenced Brazil nut harvest
regimes, with potentially long-term implications for forest-based livelihoods, and management and
conservation of Brazil nut-rich forests in Western Amazonia.
Key Words: Amazon; Bertholletia excelsa; Brazil nut; community forest management; land tenure; non-
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INTRODUCTION
Local communities may help determine tropical
forest fates. Communities now own or manage one-
quarter of the world’s tropical forests due to recent
devolution of government-owned lands and formal
recognition of customary rights (White and Martin
2002, Sunderlin et al. 2008). Such transfers of forest
ownership and management rights to local control
have the potential to promote both conservation and
livelihood development in remote tropical regions
(Sunderlin et al. 2005), where rural people often
depend on forest resources for their economic well-
being (Belcher et al. 2005). Devolution of property
rights to community control, however, does not
always promote forest conservation (Brown and
Rosendo 2000, Gould 2006, Tacconi 2007a), but
forest-dependent communities with secure rights
may place greater emphasis on long-term forest
management (McKean 2000, Colfer 2005, Sayer et
al. 2008).
Such shifts in property rights, however, can generate
forest-based conflicts, particularly when combined
with rapidly increasing values of forest resources
(de Jong et al. 2006). Also, rising resource prices
may increase demand for property rights security
(Demsetz 1967), and costs of enforcing those
increasingly valuable rights may become
prohibitive (Fitzpatrick 2006). Legitimate users
may be excluded while others gain control
(Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008). Furthermore,
as property rights shift and conflicts arise, the ability
to enforce formal and informal rules that dictate
resource use, long considered the basis of successful
community-based resource management (Ostrom
1990, Agrawal 2001), may be jeopardized.
A simple, yet common manifestation of emergent
forest-based conflicts is theft of forest resources,
especially when demand for forest products is high
and local access and exclusion rights are weakened
(Koning et al. 2007). Illegal logging is a clear
example of forest resource theft, and some of its
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primary causes are weak state governance, unclear
property rights, and strong economic incentives for
illegality (Tacconi 2007b). In ill-defined property
regimes in the developing tropical world, resource
theft could be either real or perceived. In real
resource theft, criminals take advantage of tenure
insecurity to take another person’s property without
their consent. In perceived resource theft,
contradictory policies and confusion over the
changing property rights systems create a situation
where different actors feel entitled to the same
resources. For instance, in the Eastern Brazilian
Amazon, violent conflicts between landowners and
squatters ensued when incompatible legal rights
were granted to each of these groups on lands that
were rapidly increasing in value (Schmink and
Wood 1992, Alston et al. 2000). In this insecure
context, timber thieves took advantage of the
insecure tenure situation to pilfer valuable logs
(Blate et al. 2002, Ros-Tonen et al. 2008). In
northern Bolivia, overlapping land titles were
granted to communities, timber concessions, and
private estates, which resulted in conflicts,
including perceived theft of high-value forest
resources (Ruiz 2005).
These and other examples of forest-based conflicts
suggest that much caution is needed during the
increasingly common process of formalizing
communities’ often complex customary rights to
land and resources. Communities manage natural
resources both as common-pool and private assets
(Ostrom 2003), with rights governed by local
institutions often adapting over time (Gibson et al.
2000). Such complex property rights can be
perceived as “webs of interest” made up of
overriding, overlapping, complementary, or
contested interests between multiple actors.
Formalizing communal tenure may be akin to
“cutting the web” (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi
2008) if customary rules are overturned, and can
result in unsustainable resource use if community
members are unsure which rules apply (Fitzpatrick
2006). Furthermore, granting titles to land often
ignores traditional tree tenure systems common in
tropical forests (Fortmann and Bruce 1988),
resulting in discrepancies between formal and
customary rights. These arguments are not meant to
diminish the importance of land titling, communal
or otherwise, but rather highlight the need to not
only address conflictive external claims to land and
resources but also to recognize internal differences
within communities (Agrawal and Gibson 1999) in
the titling process, and to be alert to potential
conflicts as they arise.
We explored the linkages between forest-based
conflicts and property rights shifts through
comparative research on the phenomenon of Brazil
nut theft in neighboring Pando, Bolivia and Acre,
Brazil in Western Amazonia. In this context, we
define theft as the victim’s perceived removal of
their Brazil nuts without consent, independent of
whether or not the perpetrator actually committed a
wrongful act. Brazil nut (Bertholletia excelsa) is the
most important non-timber forest product (NTFP)
in this region, and while individual trees are
considered key livelihood assets by forest dwellers
in both countries, thefts of Brazil nuts in Bolivia had
escalated and even generated violent responses at
the onset of our study (El Deber 2005). We focus
our comparison on these two adjacent areas because
while they share a similar natural resource base and
both have undergone recent property rights shifts to
community control, there are marked differences in
national forest policies and dependence on Brazil
nuts by local communities. In this paper, we
describe this contextual backdrop, and then present
results of field studies on rural livelihoods and
reported Brazil nuts thefts, and explore the causes
of such thefts, along with their management
implications. Specifically, we ask (1) To what
extent do Brazil nut thefts occur in forest-dwelling
communities in Pando and Acre? (2) What is the
impact of these thefts on rural livelihoods? (3)
Under what circumstances are thefts more likely to
occur? and (4) How does threat of theft affect Brazil
nut harvest and management? This comparative
study addresses broader issues related to the role of
property rights security and resource conflicts,
livelihoods, and tropical forest management and
conservation by rural communities.
Study region
In the approximately 220,000 km2 border region of
Acre, Brazil and Pando, Bolivia, many non-
indigenous extractive communities – whose
principal livelihood activity is collection of forest
products – share the landscape with indigenous
groups and more recently settled farmers, cattle
ranchers, and loggers. The region is characterized
by lowland wet tropical forest vegetation, but
settlement histories, patterns of deforestation,
public policy, and socioeconomic development
vary considerably from one country to the next (w
ww.map-amazonia.net). Construction of the
Interoceanic Highway, an extension of the Brazilian
BR-317 into Peru, is changing conditions in this
formerly remote region by providing regional
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access to Pacific ports (Fig. 1). In Acre, forest
conversion has been rapid, extensive, and largely
driven by establishment of cattle ranches (Souza et
al. 2006). In Pando, in contrast, deforestation has
been minimal, with most land conversion occurring
near population centers and along the Brazilian
border (Marsik et al. in press).
Role of Brazil nut in forest conservation and
livelihood development
Because of its combined ecological and economic
characteristics, Brazil nut has the potential to
promote forest conservation while contributing to
the livelihoods of rural communities. Brazil nuts are
collected almost solely from mature upland forests.
At maturity, these trees are giants; they emerge
above the forest canopy, attain up to 3 m in diameter,
and live for centuries. Because of its massive size
and high relative densities, this species provides
important ecological structural and functional roles
at the local and landscape scale (Zuidema 2003). Its
large, woody fruits fall to the ground during the wet
season and retain the approximately 25 seeds
(hereafter referred to as nuts) inside the hard
pericarp. The scatterhoarding agouti (Dasyprocta 
spp.), a rodent, is one of the few animals that can
gnaw through the hard fruits, and it plays an
instrumental role in seed dispersal and burial.
People access the nuts by gathering the heavy fruits
in large piles, breaking them open with a machete,
and then gathering the released nuts in large sacks
for transport out of the forest. Although Peres et al.
(2003) suggested that decades of commercial
harvesting may leave insufficient juvenile
recruitment to ensure future generations, populations
in Western Amazonia appear to be viable over the
medium-term under a range of harvest intensities
(Zuidema and Boot 2002, Wadt et al. 2008).
Harvested nuts can be counted on as a seasonal
contribution to local livelihoods because there is
little variability in fruit production at the population
level across years (Kainer et al. 2007). The nuts fetch
relatively high prices on local, national, and
international markets, particularly since 2003,
largely due to crop failures of other economically
competitive nuts. Western Amazonia is the current
center of the Brazil nut economy, employing tens
of thousands of families during the primary
collection season (January–March; Bojanic 2001).
Because of Brazil nut’s regional economic
importance, Brazilian, Bolivian, and Peruvian
legislation prohibit felling the trees.
History of forest extraction and devolution of
community rights in Western Amazonia
The history of colonization and settlement by non-
indigenous extractive populations in Acre and
Pando began in the late 19th century during the first
boom in natural rubber (Hevea brasiliensis), and
has since been shaped by distinct changes in policy
and market demands (Table 1). Immigration to
rubber estates in the Western Amazon, into Pando
and what is now Acre (which at the time was
officially Bolivian territory; Barham and Coomes
1996), exploded after the 1870s. When Malaysian
plantation rubber entered the international market
in 1912, rubber prices fell, and Brazilian and
Bolivian rubber tappers began to diversify their
livelihood strategies to include Brazil nuts and
agriculture as seasonal, complementary activities
(Fifer 1970, Barham and Coomes 1996, Stoian
2000). Some value-added processing of Brazil nuts
also was introduced. Although a second, smaller
rubber boom ensued when Asian plantation rubber
was monopolized by the Japanese in World War II
(Sobrinho 1992), it was short-lived, and slowly
Brazil nuts began to play a more prominent role in
regional livelihoods. By the 1950s, nut exports
surpassed those of rubber, and the first “official
boom” of the Brazil nut sector occurred in the 1990s
(Stoian 2000).
Although the rubber industry did not promote long-
term economic development in Amazonia
(Weinstein 1983, Barham and Coomes 1996), it was
critical in setting the stage for current Brazil nut
harvester settlement patterns. In Acre and Pando,
communities were formed by families of rubber
tappers who continued to live on rubber estates even
after rubber prices dropped. In Acre, these families
maintained their traditional isolated distributions
throughout the forest even as the lands beneath them
were either sold off or abandoned by the traditional
rubber estate owners to cattle ranchers (Sobrinho
1992). In contrast, families in Pando tended to
congregate as rubber lost value, while owners of
these forested estates maintained their privileged
position by dominating large-scale production of
Brazil nuts (Stoian 2000). This communal
settlement pattern was reinforced as municipal
governments provided infrastructure and services
to communities in response to Bolivia’s 1994
Popular Participation Law. Formation of concentrated
communities in Pando meant that forest
landholdings were occupied only during portions of
the Brazil nut harvest season (Cronkleton et al.
2007; Fig. 2). During the 1990s, key policy changes
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Fig. 1. Map of Madre de Dios, Peru, Acre, Brazil and Pando, Bolivia (MAP region) with main roads
indicated (including new stretch of paved Interoceanic Highway from Assis to Puerto Maldonado),
along with communities sampled in Acre and Pando.
formally recognized property rights of communities
in these two countries through the establishment of
Extractive Reserves in Brazil, and passage of a new
Forestry Law and Agrarian Reform Law in Bolivia.
The origin of these policy changes and how they
were implemented in Acre and Pando have
important consequences for extractive activities in
the region today.
Extractive Reserves, championed as a viable and
sustainable alternative to widespread deforestation
in the Amazon (Allegretti 1989, 1990), are
distinguished from other Amazonian protected
areas in that they were created “not despite but
because of people” (Ehringhaus 2006). Indeed, the
first reserves were created in Acre, where rubber
tappers intent on securing land tenure, used
international environmental concerns about the
Amazon to their advantage, portraying themselves
as forest stewards (Schmink and Wood 1992). In
this property rights model, the Brazilian
government owns the land, and usufruct rights are
guaranteed to resident communities engaged in
traditional livelihoods based largely on collection
of NTFPs; they also must maintain at least 90% of
their landholdings in forest cover (Fearnside 2003).
In the one million hectare Chico Mendes Extractive
Reserve in Acre, which was created in 1990 from
42 former rubber estates, communities are
organized into associations with decision-making
power at the Reserve level, and households spread
throughout the mostly forested landscape are
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Table 1. Important historical events and relevant forest policy changes in Acre, Brazil and Pando, Bolivia.
These events continue to affect property rights, the diversity of forest products currently exploited, and
ultimately, the frequency of Brazil nut thefts.
Acre, Brazil Pando, Bolivia
1876–1910: Rubber boom (migration to region)
1903: Acre ceded from Bolivia to Brazil (Fifer 1970) 1870s: Nicolas Suarez founds Suarez Hermanos rubber
company (Fifer 1970)
1910–1940: Decline in rubber economy;  Diversification of production to include Brazil nut harvesting and
agriculture
1912: Malaysian plantation rubber pierces global market (Weinstein 1983)
1933: Brazil nut processing plant inaugurated in Xapurí,
Acre, exporting canned nuts to the U.S.
(Wadt et al. 2008)
1931–1935: Suarez Co. introduces a Brazil nut shelling
company by a mostly female labor force (Fifer 1970)
1940–1945: Renewed demand for rubber
1942: Brazil–U.S. Washington Accords to recruit Brazilian
rubber tappers to Amazon (Sobrinho 1992)
Suarez and Hermanos control 80% of rubber production in
Brazil–Bolivia border (Fifer 1970)
1950–1990s: Brazil nuts replace rubber as main forest product
1986: Removal of Brazilian subsidy for rubber that had been extended to Bolivian producers
1990s: New policies for extractive communities
1990: Extractive Reserves 1996: Forestry Law and Agrarian Reform Law
granted individual parcels (Vadjunec et al. 2009)
that can range from 300 to more than 1000 ha. Even
though Brazil nut has replaced rubber as the most
important forest product (Wallace 2004), the unique
tree tenure legacy from the rubber era is still
honored, and reserve residents define individual
property holdings by the number and distribution of
rubber trails through the forest (Ankersen and
Barnes 2005). Proprietors of Brazil nut trees that
fall within individual parcels are locally well
defined.
In Bolivia, the Forestry Law and the Agrarian
Reform Law, both passed in 1996, affected forest-
dwelling communities in Pando. Although the
Forestry Law focused on timber production, it had
several important implications for community
management of NTFPs. In particular, establishment
of an area-based land tax discouraged timber
companies from maintaining large landholdings,
making more forested land available to
communities (Contreras and Vargas 2001). Forest
access was democratized by recognition of
indigenous subsistence rights and creation of
several avenues through which communities could
participate in logging – an activity previously
prohibited (Ruiz 2005). In the early 2000s, despite
ongoing struggles between large landholders and
communities to control forest resources and lands,
modifications of the Agrarian Reform Law in
northern Bolivia gave forest-dwelling communities
legal rights to 500 ha per family, with the total area
of the communal title determined by the official
number of resident families (Ruiz 2005, Cronkleton
and Pacheco 2010). As of 2008, 139 of the 163
communities in Pando had received titles based on
the 500-ha decree (Cronkleton and Pacheco 2010),
including the nine communities located within the
Manuripi National Wildlife Reserve, a 750,000-ha
protected area for sustainable use that is a mosaic
of private estates and communities (Kühne 2004).
Despite these successes in community titling, there
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Fig. 2. Google Earth images from July 2007 of forest-based settlements in Acre, Brazil (left) and Pando,
Bolivia (right). Note contrast between dispersed pattern of household clearings in Acre’s Chico Mendes
Extractive Reserve (households circled) and a concentrated community settlement in Pando (community
circled).
was little acknowledgement of customary resource
rights or consultation with the communities
themselves in the process. For instance,
proprietorship in these communities had been
increasingly defined by the natural distribution of
Brazil nut trees throughout the forest such that even
in cases where official community institutions are
weak, access and exclusionary rights to Brazil nut
trees and trails are often clearly defined, especially
in well-established communities (Cronkleton et al.
2010). The 500-ha decree, however, did not take
rights to Brazil nut trees into account, and erroneous
expectations emerged that the government would
rearrange internal resource access so that everyone
could have a 500-ha plot, undercutting the
traditional tree tenure system. In many cases,
communal titles were incongruent with the natural
external boundaries that communities had used for
seasonal forest use, such as rivers, and maps
presented to communities lacked geographic
features that were familiar to residents, causing
boundary problems to go unnoticed (Cronkleton et
al. 2010). Also, the calculation of total community
area, based on 500 ha per person, was often based
on erroneous community lists. Such errors in the
formalization of communal rights resulted in a
climate of property rights insecurity and conflicts
within and between newly titled communities in
Pando (Cronkleton et al. 2010).
METHODS
Field evaluation of rural livelihoods, Brazil nut
thefts, and management practices
We evaluated rural livelihoods, reported Brazil nut
thefts, and nut management practices in eight
communities in Pando and four in Acre through
interviews with 189 households (131 in Pando, 58
in Acre) and through participation in the 2006 and
2007 Brazil nut harvests. In Pando, communities
were chosen to represent differences in market
access (river vs. road) and distance to major market
centers, and were located both within (4) and outside
(4) of the Manuripi National Wildlife Reserve. In
Acre, the four communities sampled differed in their
proximity to rivers or roads and their distance to
central markets, but all were in the Chico Mendes
Extractive Reserve (Fig. 1). Large distances
between households in Acre extended field survey
time, precluding an equal sample size between the
two countries. In communities with < 30 families,
all available families participated in the study;
otherwise, representative samples were chosen at
random from lists of total households that were
generated through consultation with community
leaders.
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To evaluate rural livelihoods, we conducted two
annual village and household-level socioeconomic
and environmental questionnaires and four
quarterly household questionnaires from June 2006
through August 2007, as part of the Center for
International Forestry Research Poverty and
Environment Network (CIFOR PEN; http://www.c
ifor.cgiar.org/pen/_ref/home/index.htm). We quan-
tified general livelihood variables through the
village and household-level annual surveys and
used quarterly surveys over a 12-month period to
measure subsistence and cash income derived from
forests and other on- and off-farm activities,
including agriculture, livestock, wage labor, and
other sources of external economic support. We
used this detailed evaluation to calculate total
household income and analyze the relative
contribution of Brazil nut to household livelihoods
in Pando and Acre.
Since it was impossible to attain observational
information on Brazil nut thefts, we relied on
informant accounts of where and how many nuts
were stolen from them by whom, and what, if
anything, was done to resolve the matter during the
2006 and 2007 nut harvests. Producers were able to
estimate the quantity of Brazil nuts stolen based on
the number of opened fruit shells left on the ground
when nuts were collected. To evaluate Brazil nut
harvest and management practices, we categorized
them by (1) initial harvest date, (2) harvest method
and overall harvest duration, and (3) management
practices  designed  to (a) promote  regeneration
(e.g., protection of seedlings from fire), (b) enhance
fruit yield (e.g., vine cutting), and (c) meet
certification standards (e.g., nut drying). These
management variables were chosen from local
literature on best management practices (e.g., Wadt
et al. 2005) and the first author’s participation in the
2006 Brazil nut harvest. We also recorded apparent
lack of management, as well as intentional or
unintentional practices that may adversely affect
individual trees.
Data analysis
To understand basic quantitative differences
between Brazil nut-producing households in Pando
and Acre, we generated descriptive statistics for (1)
household characteristics, access to government
services, land tenure, distance to markets and forest
resources, and income; (2) incidence, type, and
financial costs of nut thefts; and (3) nut harvest and
management practices. We then performed several
analyses to evaluate variables that predicted, or were
predicted by, presence or absence of theft. For these
analyses, the data set included measurements from
171 of the total 189 households (125 in Pando and
51 in Acre) that had robust records over two
consecutive years (2006 and 2007). Therefore, this
data set corresponded to repeated measures with two
time points.
In the first analytical stage, we searched for
relationships between reported incidence of theft
and possible predictor variables for both countries
using two years of combined data. For discrete
variables, such as road or river access and
perceptions of property rights security, Chi-square
tests were used. For continuous variables, such as
distance to market, distance from households to
individual nut stands, and income derived from
Brazil nuts, logistic regressions were fitted. This
process guided our selection of potentially relevant
variables (p ≤ 0.10) to be included in a more
complete, single model to analyze theft. For this,
we developed a stepwise generalized linear model
based on a binomial distribution and a logit link
where model response was presence or absence of
theft. Autocorrelation of the errors was evaluated
because these data contained repeated measures, but
was not statistically significant and therefore was
dropped from the analysis. Models were fitted using
the software SPSS Statistics GradPack 17.0 (2008).
In the second analytical stage, we searched for
relationships between reported incidence of theft
and possible harvest and management response
variables across four subgroups comprising country
x year combinations. Again, for discrete variables,
such as Brazil nut harvest method and specific
management practices, Chi-square tests were used.
For continuous explanatory variables, such as
length of harvest and amount of nuts collected, we
used ANOVA. Again, this process guided our
selection of potentially relevant variables (p ≤ 0.10)
to be included in a model that combined data from
all countries and years to investigate presence or
absence of theft as a predictor of harvest and
management.
We modeled each selected response variable
considering a year and group factor, together with
interactions. Year and group were assumed to be
fixed effects. Group factor was a categorical
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variable formed by three classes: (1) observations
with theft in Pando, (2) observations without theft
in Pando, and (3) observations without theft in Acre.
Thefts in Acre were so rare (only 11 reported over
a 2-year period) that a fourth potential class (i.e.,
observations with theft in Acre) was not statistically
viable for model inclusion. In this analysis, the
presence of autocorrelation among observations
was relevant and therefore was incorporated into the
model. The continuous and discrete responses were
fitted by using a linear mixed model and a
generalized linear mixed model, respectively, as
implemented in GenStat v.11 (Payne et al. 2007).
RESULTS
Comparative livelihoods data
Overall, while households in Pando and Acre were
similar in terms of size, land area, and time lived in
the community, they differed significantly in
distance to markets and forest resources (Table 2).
While more than half of households sampled in both
places had access to roads from village centers,
communities in Pando were located much farther
from market centers (p < 0.001). Also, in Pando,
distance from households to individual Brazil nut
stands was greater than in Acre (p < 0.001). This
difference reflects the concentrated nature of
communities in Pando, which contrasts with the
more diffuse spread of Acrean forest-based
households. Households sampled in Pando had
more years of schooling (p < 0.001) and better
access to health services (p < 0.001), whereas
households in Acre had better access to piped water
(p < 0.001; Table 2). There was also some evidence
that households in Pando had better access to
electricity (p = 0.06; Table 2).
While total income was similar, income derived
from forests and Brazil nuts was greater in Pando
than in Acre (Table 2). Forest income made up 63%
of the total share in Pando versus 42% in Acre (Table
2). Similarly, Brazil nut income, as a subset of
forest-based income, contributed significantly more
to household livelihoods in Pando than in Acre. In
Pando, Brazil nuts alone contributed 43% of the total
income share versus just 14% in Acre (Table 2).
Reported mean (and SD) volume of nuts harvested
per household in Pando was 6187 (± 7590) kg in
2006 (n = 125) and 4508 (± 3856) kg in 2007 (n =
115). In Acre, it was much less at 1807 (± 1844) kg
in 2006 and 1812 (± 1737) kg in 2007.
Frequency, causes, and effects of reported
Brazil nut thefts
Theft of Brazil nuts was reportedly much more
frequent in Pando than in Acre (p < 0.001). In Pando,
approximately half of all households reported nut
thefts: 61% of 125 households in 2006, and 45% of
115 in 2007. In Acre, only 14% of 51 households
and 9% of 42 households reported nut thefts in 2006
and 2007 harvests, respectively. In both countries,
most thefts were of nuts from the forest floor (81%
in Pando and 91% in Acre), rather than of sacks or
storage areas, suggesting that some reported thefts
were due to confusion over customary tree tenure
rather than outright stealing.
Nut thieves were reportedly members of the same
community, members of neighboring communities,
or, at least in Pando, migrant workers employed by
private estates during the harvest season (Fig. 3).
Most of these workers arrived in large boats from
the downstream city of Riberalta where they were
employed in nut shelling and drying during the rest
of the year. In Pando, half of all thefts were reputedly
committed by members of the same community
(45% in 2006, 52% in 2007). In Acre, all 11 cases
of thefts were reportedly perpetrated by other
harvesters from the same and neighboring
communities – migrant workers hired for nut
collection were nonexistent.
In Pando, reported volumes of Brazil nut thefts were
substantial (Table 3), comprising 22% of the total
combined harvest in 2006 and 2007. This meant
annual losses of US$719 (range $11–$5750),
representing 13% of the US$5394 mean (±$4764
SD) annual combined subsistence and market
income per household in Pando. In labor terms, the
estimated mean of 1498 kg of nuts stolen per year
represents the loss of approximately 22 days of
household labor, given that 69 kg of nuts is
equivalent to one day’s labor. In Acre, with minimal
reported thefts and proportionately less income
from Brazil nuts, financial consequences of thefts
were far less important.
Results of the Generalized Linear Model showed
that distance variables were the most important
quantitative determinants of Brazil nut theft (Table
4). Households with nut stands farther away from
the home tended to experience more thefts (p <
0.001), as did households in communities further
from markets (p = 0.001). There may have been a
slight tendency (p = 0.136) for households with
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of household characteristics, access to government services, distance
variables, and household income sources in Pando and Acre.
 Pando, Bolivia  Acre, Brazil 
 
Variable N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) p value
Household characteristics
Size (# people) 125 6.0 (2.8) 51 5.4 (2.9) 0.159
Land area (ha) 125 587 (470) 51 638 (499) 0.519
Head of household born in community 125 0.20 (0.40) 51 0.20 (0.40) 0.670
Time lived in community (yrs) 125 17 (15) 51 15 (11) 0.238
Schooling (cumulative yrs) 125 21.4 (13.7) 51 12.3 (7.7) <0.001
Access to government services
Electricity 125 0.38 (0.49) 51 0.24 (0.43) 0.060
Piped water 125 0 (0) 51 0.18 (0.39) <0.001
Health services 125 0.30 (0.46) 51 0 (0) <0.001
Distance
Road access 125 0.65 (0.48) 51 0.78 (0.42) 0.078
Distance to market from village center† (hrs) 125 9.5 (7.1) 51 2.4 (1.4) <0.001
Distance to Brazil nut stand from household
(min)
124 81 (93) 51 6 (4) <0.001
Household income 2006–2007‡
Total income (USD)
Forest-based income (USD)
Brazil nut income (USD)
107
107
107
5394 (4764); 100% 
3423 (3604); 63% 
2304 (1837); 43%
47
47
47
5460 (2759); 100%
2319 (1295); 42%
765 (973); 14%
0.930
0.043
<0.001
†In the dispersed settlement in the Chico Mendes Extractive Reserve in Acre, village center was defined
as the association hub where community meetings took place.
‡These values include absolute income and percent of total household income.
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Fig. 3. Suspected perpetrators of Brazil nut thefts in 2006 and 2007 (% of total incidents). Sample
includes only those households that reportedly experienced thefts.
greater income derived from Brazil nuts to be more
vulnerable to theft, but neither household land area
(p = 0.277) nor road versus river access (p = 0.534)
were implicated.
Brazil nut harvest regimes were distinctly different
in Pando and Acre. Harvest began much earlier and
lasted much longer in Pando than in Acre (Fig. 4).
The year x group analysis used to compare harvest
and management patterns across countries and
incidence of theft showed a significant difference
between both harvest start date and duration of
harvest in Pando versus Acre (p < 0.001), as well as
quantity of nuts collected (p = 0.007). No country-
level differences were detected within Bolivia,
however, when comparing households that directly
experienced theft with those that did not (Table 5).
Harvesters reported the use of three different
collection methods: (1) collect as many fruits as
possible in one day, breaking them open for
immediate transport of nuts from the forest; (2)
collect and group fruits from one trail into piles,
leaving them in the forest for one to several days
Ecology and Society 16(1): 4
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art4/
Table 3. Total volume and value of Brazil nuts reported stolen in 2006 and 2007 combined. Values in USD
based on mean price/year paid to collectors by middlemen during the 2006 ($0.46/kg in Pando; $0.40/kg
in Acre) and 2007 ($0.50/kg in Pando; $0.44/kg in Acre) harvests.
 Pando, Bolivia  Acre, Brazil
Variable N Mean (SD) Range N Mean (SD) Range
Amount stolen (kg) 104 1498 (1810) 23–11,500 9 216 (158) 58–483
Percent of harvest (%) 104 22 (19) 0.82–100 9 10 (7) 0.5–23
Value (USD) 104 719 (875) 11–5750 9 90 (67) 23–202
and then returning to open them; or (3) over the
course of several days or weeks, collect and group
all fruits from one’s landholding and then return to
open them later. Notably, 96% of Bolivian
collectors, whether they experienced theft or not,
gathered, opened, and transported nuts in the same
day, whereas Brazilian producers engaged in a
variety of collection methods (Fig. 5). Most
Bolivian producers indicated threat of theft as the
main reason they transported nuts out of the forest
early in the season and as quickly as possible.
With the exception of the collection practices
described above, no correlations were found
between incidence of theft and implementation of
any other specific management practices (e.g.,
protecting seedlings from fire, vine cutting) in
Pando and Acre. This finding suggests that despite
threat of theft, people felt enough proprietorship
over their Brazil nut stands to manage for future
fruit production and tree growth.
Victims of nut theft rarely received compensation
for their losses. In Pando, only 17% of the 76 cases
of theft in 2006 and 6% of 52 cases in 2007 came
to some resolution. Of the 11 theft cases reported in
Brazil in 2006 and 2007 combined, only two were
resolved. Resolution usually involved discussions
between the two conflicting parties, with full or
partial success in the return of stolen nuts. In some
cases, community officials mediated the disputes.
In one extreme case in Pando, where workers of a
former private estate owner stole an estimated 4600
kg from a newly titled community, a municipal
official helped resolve the issue. The officer
attended a community meeting, exercised his
authority, and ensured that the monetary equivalent
of the stolen Brazil nuts was returned and
redistributed to the whole community.
DISCUSSION
We found a much greater incidence of reported
Brazil nut thefts in Pando, Bolivia than in the
adjacent state of Acre, Brazil. Although we were
unable to study the direct causes, our analyses
suggest three factors may have affected nut thefts
in the forest: (1) contrasts in the timing and process
of formally recognizing property rights, (2)
different historic settlement patterns, and (3)
varying degrees of economic dependence on Brazil
nuts.
Comparative timing and process of property
rights formalization
Whereas forest residents in Acre and Pando share
very similar extractive histories, when and how
property rights were devolved to them differed, and
while speculative, seemed to impact reported
resource thefts. “Demand from below” motivated
by social movements and local governments
(Larson et al. 2007) is considered an important
component of effective decentralization measures
(Larson and Soto 2008). In Acre, the Extractive
Reserve model was a response to a bottom-up,
successful political struggle by rubber tappers to
secure property rights. As a result, customary tenure
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Table 4. Results of a stepwise logistic regression used to identify the most important measured variables
that explained incidence of Brazil nut thefts in 2006 and 2007 in Pando and Acre (n = 235). No significant
interactions between variables were detected.
Variable Estimate Wald P value Odds Ratio
Distance to Brazil nut stand from household (min) 0.001 13.051 <0.001 1.001
Distance to market from village center (hrs) 0.023 11.891 0.001 1.023
Income from Brazil nuts (USD) 0.00002 2.224 0.136 1.000
Total landholding area (ha) 0.00006 1.183 0.277 1.000
Road access -0.057 0.387 0.534 -
of dispersed household settlements throughout the
forest was recognized when land rights were
formally devolved. The inner boundaries of
individual landholdings continued to be as well
defined among extractivists as they were during the
rubber era. The outer boundary of the Chico Mendes
Extractive Reserve was relatively undisputed when
the reserve was created because claims contested by
large landholders were mostly settled by the federal
government and were heavily regulated by the
Brazilian environmental protection agency (C.V.
Gomes, personal communication). At the time of
our field research (2005–2007), residents of the
Reserve had more than 15 years to adjust to the
property rights supported by reserve creation in
1990. Reserve co-management with the Brazilian
government engenders continuous dialogue related
to extractivist rights to land and resources.
In contrast, communities in Pando only recently
emerged from a struggle with private estate owners
to have their customary property rights recognized
by the government. Additionally, this formalization
of rights was handed down from the state to mostly
well-established communities that had managed
their Brazil nut groves communally for many years
via internal norms and rules. Our data showed the
greatest proportion of thefts in Pando was presumed
to be by members of the same community.
Throughout Pando, such intra-community conflicts
were commonly associated with the 500-ha decree,
which created local confusion that the government
would rearrange internal resource access so that
everyone could have a 500-ha plot. Additionally,
there was often abrupt incorporation of landless
people into already established communities to
facilitate access to land and municipal services;
these newcomers were probably unaware of
customary management systems. In sum, the more
recent, top-down process of formalizing communal
tenure in Pando may have resulted in comparatively
greater property rights insecurity and increased
incidence of thefts. This type of confusion over
internal property rights along with high economic
incentives for uncontrolled collection (Tacconi
2007b) contrasts with other studies on surreptitious
forestry activities, such as illegal logging, which are
often the result of operations by sophisticated
clandestine organizations (Honey-Roses 2009).
Influence of settlement patterns and resource
dependence on theft
The distinct spatial distribution of forest-dwelling
communities in Acre versus Pando also contributed
to observed differences in reported Brazil nut thefts.
This finding was supported by our quantitative
result that distance of household to Brazil nut stand
was the most important predictor of theft. In Acre,
through creation of the Chico Mendes Extractive
Reserve, households maintained their traditional
dispersed spatial distribution throughout the forest,
allowing them close access to and daily interactions
with their forested landholdings (Allegretti 1990).
These nut collectors walk their properties to hunt,
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Fig. 4. Modal start and end dates of Brazil nut harvest, and harvest duration, in Pando and Acre in 2006
and 2007. Primary harvest period (dark gray) is when most producers report the beginning and end of
harvest. Extended harvest period (light gray) is indicated by earliest and latest harvest dates.
tap rubber, work their agricultural fields, and travel
to neighboring households. They constantly
monitor their land and resources, dealing with
disputes quickly. In Pando, in contrast, the 1994
Popular Participation Law encouraged the
concentration of rural families in settlements to
access municipal government education, health,
water, and electricity services. This policy had the
unintended result of removing families from day-
to-day monitoring of their forest resources. Our data
showed that households with Brazil nut harvest
areas far from village centers experienced more nut
thefts, likely by members of neighboring
communities and migrant workers. While Bolivian
harvesters would relocate to remote harvest areas
for portions of the nut harvest, these stays were often
intermittent so as to maintain connections with the
village center for supplies. Disputes over resources
might only manifest themselves during the Brazil
nut harvest, which contrasts markedly with the year-
round patrols of Acrean extractivists of their
forested landholdings. That said, the higher
education levels and better access to health services
among nut producers in Pando, along with some
evidence of better access to electricity, showed that
while Brazilian producers may be better able to
monitor their forest landholdings, their access to
services (with the exception of piped water) is
indeed inferior when compared with their Bolivian
counterparts. Such a trade-off could have negative
implications for rural development in Acre.
In addition to differences in spatial settlement
patterns, higher relative dependence on Brazil nuts
in Pando versus Acre (Table 2) may also have
influenced theft of this high-value resource. Due to
more livelihood options in Acre, Brazil nuts were
relatively less important economically, and were
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Table 5. Mean and standard error of Brazil nut harvest start date (expressed in Julian days where 1 = 8
November), quantity of Brazil nuts collected (kg), and harvest duration (days) in three Brazil nut harvest
contexts in Bolivia and Brazil in 2006 and 2007.
Variable 1. Bolivia: Thefts 2. Bolivia: No thefts 3. Brazil: No thefts
Harvest start date 60.53 (1.98) 56.37 (2.08) 86.44 (2.48)†
Quantity 163.12 (13.16) 153.53 (13.08) 114.34 (12.06)‡
Harvest duration 94.74 (3.66) 91.92 (3.83) 43.25 (4.43)†
Notes: Group 3 differed from Groups 1 and 2 for all variables: †p < 0.001; ‡p < 0.01. Year x group
interactions were not significant.
considered just one of many seasonal income and
subsistence activities. Although we found only
weak statistical evidence that increased income
from Brazil nuts was correlated with theft, the
relatively high value of this one product in Pando is
undeniable. Indeed, when a dramatic rise in global
Brazil nut prices occurred in 2005, violent conflicts
ensued, which resulted in deaths of several people
in Pando (El Deber 2005); no such response
occurred in neighboring Acre.
Livelihood, management, and conservation
implications
The difference in threat of Brazil nut theft
influenced harvest practices in Acre and Pando. The
low incidence of nut thefts in Acre allowed
harvesters to be flexible in their collection method.
Acrean harvesters typically were unconcerned with
potential theft of nuts, and thus began their harvest
after most fruits had fallen to the ground. Harvesting
later in the fruit-fall season allowed them to
concentrate their efforts and collect all nuts within
a few weeks. They then transported nuts out of the
forest all at once using draft animals, which overall
is an easier and more efficient practice. In contrast,
harvesters in Pando gathered, opened, and
transported nuts from a subset of their trees in one
day, and then repeated this process throughout their
stand until all trees were visited. They were also
compelled to collect nuts early in the season, which
is a dangerous and sometimes fatal practice because
the heavy fruits are still falling from trees that are
up to 50 m tall. This collection method is also
relatively inefficient. Nuts must be carried on the
harvesters’ shoulders, and then hauled to a storage
area or temporary hiding place. During our field
research, Bolivian harvesters consistently reported
that these procedures diminished the possibility that
their gathered fruits could be stolen. Although our
data showed no differences in harvest methods
between households that did or did not experience
thefts, we conclude that the general climate of
resource insecurity in Bolivia forced all harvesters
to manage their stands as if thefts could occur at any
time.
The extended Brazil nut harvest in Pando can also
be attributed to rural households’ heavy economic
dependence on this one product. They need all the
cash they can get from their nut stands since there
is a distinct lack of economic alternatives in Pando
when compared to Acre. Producers in Pando visited
the same trees many times over the harvest season
to continuously collect fruits immediately after
natural fruit fall. Two ecological studies that
measured Brazil nut harvest intensity by humans in
Acre and Pando support this difference in economic
dependence. In Acre, Wadt et al. (2008) reported
nut collection intensities of 45% and 71% of fallen
fruits harvested at two Chico Mendes Extractive
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Fig. 5. Percentage of households using specific Brazil nut harvest methods among three groups: (1)
Bolivia with nut thefts, (2) Bolivia without nut thefts, and (3) Brazil without nut thefts. In every case, the
proportion of households implementing these methods in Brazil was statistically different from the
proportion of households in Bolivia (p < 0.001). There were no differences in harvest methods employed
by the Bolivian groups (with or without Brazil nut thefts).
Reserve sites, which is much lower than the
estimated 93% collection intensity reported at sites
in Pando by Zuidema and Boot (2002). This
economic dependence on Brazil nuts in Pando is
likely not only a reason for nut thefts, it also
enhances the negative effects of thefts on
households that depend on this one product.
These disparate harvest systems in Pando and Acre
result in ecological and economic trade-offs. Late
season harvests allow Bolivian producers to take
advantage of higher nut prices as middlemen and
companies attempt to fill their yearly quotas. On the
other hand, the Brazilian short-season harvest
method may allow a longer period for the
scatterhoarding agouti to both consume and disperse
nuts, potentially promoting Brazil nut regeneration
and long-term ecological sustainability of the
system. That said, Brazilian harvesters also
commonly convert secondary fallows (which
provide favorable regeneration sites for B. excelsa 
[Cotta et al. 2008]) to pasture – a practice clearly
detrimental to landscape-level Brazil nut production
and forest conservation in general. Nonetheless,
cattle production also diversifies the Brazilian
livelihood system and results in less dependence on
one product.
Finally, different harvest systems in Acre and Pando
also have market consequences. A main
impediment to international Brazil nut sales is
contamination by aflatoxins, which are both toxic
Ecology and Society 16(1): 4
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art4/
and carcinogenic, and are produced by the fungus
Aspergillus. When European importers raised their
quality standards for Brazil nuts in 1998, access to
the European market was imperiled (Newing and
Harrop 2000). In Acre, fruits that fall in December
and are not collected until February or March,
appear to have higher aflotoxin risk (L.H.O. Wadt,
personal communication) because Aspergillus 
thrives under hot and humid conditions (Hudler
1998). Nuts transported out of the forest just after
fruit fall, as in Bolivia, are less likely to be
contaminated. Organic and Fair Trade certification
of Brazil nuts, through the sale of an aflatoxin-free
product and affiliation with cooperatives, have been
important in stabilizing and even increasing the
price producers receive for nuts while encouraging
better management practices. Interestingly, collection
earlier in the season is now being promoted as a
“best management practice” in Acre as one step
towards attaining certification, which may alter
harvest regimes there. That said, given the human
safety and ecological concerns associated with early
season collection, only one early collection trip after
peak fruit fall in January is recommended,
especially since the practice of drying nuts post-
collection is considered most important for
minimizing aflatoxin risk (L.H.O. Wadt, personal
communication). If certification were to substantially
increase the price for Brazil nuts in Acre, producers
might allocate more time to nut collection in relation
to other livelihood activities. Nonetheless, while
collectors in Acre can flexibly choose nut harvest
regime and harvest length, collectors in Pando are
forced into an early and lengthy harvest due to threat
of theft and high economic dependence on Brazil
nuts.
CONCLUSIONS
Several important lessons can be learned from this
comparative study in Western Amazonia. First, the
outcome of land tenure reforms depends on the
timing and process of property rights formalization
in local communities. In Pando, as demand for clear
property rights increased with rising prices of Brazil
nuts, granting communal titles using a top-down
approach sometimes had the unanticipated
consequence of enhancing property rights
insecurity in any particular community. Bolivian
government agencies were unable or unwilling to
resolve conflicts over land and resources that arose
from competing interests either within communities
or between communities and other more powerful
actors (Cronkleton et al. 2007). In contrast, in Acre,
land conflicts and resource thefts are currently rare
among extractive communities. The external
Extractive Reserve boundary was strongly enforced
and customary internal boundaries were left flexible
to accommodate traditional forest use. That said,
property rights security does not necessarily
translate to forest conservation as producers in Acre
exercise their rights to convert small portions of
their forested landholdings to pasture. Second,
different settlement patterns and market forces
appear to have affected nut thefts in forests. In the
case of Pando, people are much less connected with
their forested landholdings except during the nut
harvest. Even though the concentrated settlements
have allowed for improved access to government
services, this lack of physical connection, combined
with a product that is in high demand, may increase
the likelihood of conflictive situations. Government
support for demarcation of customary landholdings
by communities in Pando could be an important way
to help strengthen community forest management
institutions and mediate conflicts.
The phenomenon of Brazil nut theft has important
consequences for rural livelihoods and sustainable
forest management. As in other studies on illegal
forestry activities, the high incidence of thefts in
Pando is clearly detrimental to rural livelihoods
(Kaimowitz 2007), primarily through lost forest
income and job opportunities but also through
threats to physical security. Given the relatively
high proportion of rural household income derived
from Brazil nuts in Pando, forest-dwelling
communities are more vulnerable to the negative
effects of a stolen harvest. Additionally, collectors
unable to glean sufficient income from nuts are
likely to turn to other land uses, which may involve
converting Brazil nut-rich forests to agriculture or
pasture. Furthermore, the threat of nut theft in Pando
locks collectors into a management regime that is
clearly dangerous and inefficient, and perhaps
detrimental to long-term viability of future Brazil
nut tree populations. As trends in designating forests
for legal use by local communities continue, it is
essential to understand and address the causes and
effects of forest-based conflicts to promote rural
livelihoods and long-term management and
conservation of the world’s tropical forests.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art4/responses/
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